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This paper shows that the diverging results obtained in the literature on the rm
size-growth relationship can be reconciled in a very general theoretical framework featur-
ing rm-level heterogeneity and investment decision. Three main elements determine the
nature and the intensity of the relationship between rm-level size and investment: the
shape of operating prots with respect to size, the shape of marginal returns to investment
(in terms of size) with respect to initial size and the shape of marginal cost of investment
with respect to size. Any dierence across countries, industries or periods in one of these
three dimensions can modify the sign and the intensity of the rm size-investment and the
rm size-growth relationship at equilibrium. As an example, I show that in France, het-
erogeneous credit constraints, which aect the shape of the marginal cost of investment,
can explain cross-sectoral variations in the rm size-investment and rm size-growth rela-
tionship over the 1996-2002 period. As a consequence, from a macroeconomic viewpoint,
rm size distribution is, all else equal, more right-skewed in sectors where small rms are
disproportionately credit constrained and small rms participate less to sectorial growth
in these sectors. The analytical framework proposed in this paper is general enough to
apply to the analysis of any heterogeneous response of economic agents.
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11 Introduction
The relationship between rm-level size and performance growth has been debated in the
literature over the past decades, and the question still remains open. While the Gibrat law
stipulates that rm-level growth rate should not depend on rm size, Birch (1979, 1981) shows
that small rms grow faster and create a disproportionate share of US jobs. Further studies
on the US, Canada or Netherlands partly corroborate these results (see, e.g. Dunne, Roberts,
and Samuelson, 1989; Baldwin and Picot, 1995; Broersma and Gautier, 1997). This has fueled
the policy-makers' point of view that \small is beautiful", and that SMEs are a crucial engine
of growth. However, these conclusions have been challenged by several authors (in particular
Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Konings, 1995; Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1998), mainly
from a statistical viewpoint. The controversy is still very vivid today, with conicting recent
contributions on US data by Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2011) and Haltiwanger, Jarmin,
and Miranda (2010).
This debate on the rm size-growth relationship percolates in dierent elds of economics.
For example, it is well-known that exposure to international trade induces productivity gains
within industries through rm selection, market-shares reallocation and within-plant produc-
tivity gains (see, e.g., Melitz, 2003; Pavcnik, 2002; De Loecker, 2007). Regarding this latter
channel, a consensus has emerged to say that entry on export markets is often associated with
rm-level technology adoption or innovation. But which type of rms invest more? Initially
bigger and more productive ones, or on the opposite smaller and less productive ones? The
very recent literature in international trade diverges on this question. Bustos (2011) shows
that following the signature of MERCOSUR, Argentinian rms increased technology spend-
ings, this increase being more spectacular for initially bigger rms. By contrast, in Canada,
Lileeva and Treer (2010) nd that following the CUSFTA agreement, productivity gains
and technology investments were concentrated among initially smaller and less productive
new exporters.
In this paper, I provide a framework that can help understand and reconcile diverging
results obtained in the literature. I assume that a rm can make a capacity or a productivity-
enhancing investment in period 0 to increase its prots in period 1. I show that from a
theoretical point of view, the relationship between rm-level initial size, investment, and
performance growth depends on three main determinants: the shape of the prot function
with respect to size, the shape of marginal returns to investment in terms of size with respect
to initial size and the shape of marginal cost of investment with respect to size. If prots are
concave in size, and if marginal returns to investment do not depend on size, initially smaller
rms have greater incentives to invest; they consequently grow more. The opposite is true
if prots are convex in size. However, the relationship between initial size and performance
growth determined by the shape of prots can be altered by the shape of the marginal cost of
investment. In particular, if the marginal cost of investment is higher for smaller rms, due
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when rm-level prots are concave is attenuated or reversed. Since the three determinants I
highlight might vary across countries, sectors and/or time, the rm size-growth relationship
might itself be heterogeneous along these three dimensions.
I then test the predictions of the theoretical framework on French rm-level data over
the period 1996-2002. I rst identify, thanks to augmented Euler equations, sectors in which
nancial constraints are homogeneous across rms, and sectors in which nancial constraints
are more intense for smaller rms. I show that prots have the same concave shape in
both types of industries. As predicted by the theoretical framework, investment and sales
or employment growth are, all else equal, higher for initially smaller rms in sectors where
credit constraints are homogeneous; this negative relationship is however more muted, or
even disappears, in sectors where credit constraints are tougher for smaller rms. Results
are qualitatively the same for domestic and exporting rms. However, conditioning on the
shape of nancial constraints, the convergence process is more rapid among domestic rms.
This is explained by the fact that prots of exporting rms are less concave than prots
of domestic ones. I then show that these cross-sectoral dierences in the rm size-growth
relationship cannot be explained by heterogeneous returns to investment in terms of size.
From a macroeconomic point of view, I nally emphasize that the shape of nancial constraints
can aect both rm size distribution and the share of SME's in aggregate growth. More
specically, in sectors where small rms are disproportionately credit constrained, rm-size
distribution is more right-skewed, and small rms participate less to sectorial growth.
The role of nancial constraints in shaping the rm size-investment and rm-size growth
relationship is one possible application of the general theoretical framework provided in this
paper. This framework more generally applies to the analysis of any potentially heterogeneous
response of economic agents. In this respect, this paper provides an analytical framework that
could be useful for other topics in trade, urban economics, empirical IO or labour, among
others.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of previous
research and emphasizes the contribution of the present work. I develop my theoretical
framework in section 3, I present the data and analyze the shape of nancial constraints
and prots across sectors in section 4, and I present the results on the size-invetsment and
size-growth relationship in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Previous research and contribution
This paper relates to three strands of the literature: the literature on the rm size-growth
relationship, the literature on rm-level investment and nancial constraints, and nally the
literature on rm-level size, trade and investment.
32.1 Firm-level size and growth
The law of proportional eect developed by Robert Gibrat is the rst attempt to formalize
the link between rm-level growth and the distribution of activities within an industry (for a
detailed review on the Gibrat law, see Sutton, 1997). In this framework, rms face stochastic
business opportunities so that increments in terms of size they can reach is proportionate to
their initial size. Expected rm-level growth rate and initial size are thus not correlated. One
appealing feature of random growth processes is that they are able to generate power laws
distribution for the variable which dynamics is considered (see Gabaix, 1999, for the size of
cities), power laws being a good t for rm size distribution in many countries and industries,
at least above a certain threshold (Axtell, 2001; Luttmer, 2007; di Giovanni, Levchenko, and
Ranciere, 2010).
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship between rm-level size and growth is
rather mixed. Birch (1979, 1981) nds that in the US, smaller rms grow more rapidly than
bigger ones, and that they account for a disproportionate share of jobs creations. Dunne,
Roberts, and Samuelson (1989) qualify this result: the net expected growth rate of a rm
depends on its expected growth rate conditional on survival, and on its probability of survival.
They show that conditional on survival, small and young rms grow faster than the others.
However, small and young rms have also a higher probability of default. The authors nd
that in the end, there is still a negative relationship between initial size and net growth rate
for US single-plant rms, but the result is reversed for plants belonging to multi-plant rms.
This negative relationship between rm-level initial size and net growth rate is however
questioned. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) examine detailed patterns of jobs creations and
destructions in the US. They show that small rms have a higher gross creation rate, but
also a higher destruction rate. They nd that in terms of net employment growth rate,
manufacturing rms lose jobs in all size classes, and that no signicant dierences emerge
across size classes. On the opposite, young rms do seem to have higher net jobs creation
rates. Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1998) go further and argue that previous assessments
of the rm size-growth relationship were plagued by measurement and statistical issues. More
precisely, in some datasets (in particular US data), longitudinal linkages are dicult to follow
since changes in ownership are sometimes accompanied by changes in rm-level identication
number. This leads to spurious rm births and deaths. Moreover, usual measures of rm-level
growth
yt yt 1
yt 1 might be subject to what these authors call the \reversion to the mean" issue:
if a rm experiences a negative transitory shock in one period, it will certainly experience a
high growth rate the period after, coming back to its \long run" average size, and vice versa
in case of positive transitory shocks. To correct for this issue, the authors propose to use
yt+yt 1
2 as the reference size, instead of yt 1. This strategy, as acknowledged by the authors
themselves, has its own issues; it minimizes in particular the impact of permanent shocks.
Two very recent papers show that the controversy is not over. Neumark, Wall, and Zhang
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and Schuh (1996) on a new US dataset covering a more recent period of time. They show that
the negative relationship, even though weakened, still holds both in the manufacturing and
the services sector (even though less regular for manufacturing activities). However, Halti-
wanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010) reply that when controlling for rm age, no statistical
relationship exists anymore between rm size and growth.
In this paper, my focus is slightly dierent. I argue that the size-growth relationship
is not given but depends on the environment in which rms operate (technology, nancial
constraints etc.). This can explain why the nature and the intensity of this relationship varies
across countries, sectors or periods. I moreover relate the nature of this relationship to the
investment behavior of rms, while investment was not taken into account in the papers
cited above. I consequently focus on stayers, that is to say on rms that remain active for
a given period of time; I do not deal with entry and exit. I also introduce a distinction
between domestic and exporting rms. Regarding the regression fallacy issue, I consider
rm-level growth over a long time-span (6 years in the main regressions); I moreover rely on
a regression analysis linking rm-level growth and size, and not on a comparison of average
growth rates across size classes. This mitigates the noise introduced by transitory shocks in
the estimation of the size-growth relationship.
2.2 Firm-level investment, nancial constraints and growth
An extensive literature exists on rm-level nancial constraints, investment and growth.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the negative impact of credit constraints on growth
has been widely emphasized. Rajan and Zingales (1998), based on a dierence-in-dierences
approach, show that industrial sectors that are more dependent on external nance grow dis-
proportionately faster in countries that are better nancially developed. The underlying idea
is that nancial services, when ecient, allow to allocate capital to the highest value use. At
a micro level, Demirg u c-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) show that the proportion of rms using
long-term external nancing is higher in countries with better legal and nancial systems.
However, these papers do not deal with the heterogeneous impact of nancial constraints on
rms of dierent sizes.
Beck, Demirg u c-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2005) use rm-level survey data on self-reported
nancing and legal obstacles experienced by rms; they show that rms declaring to face
nancial constraints have, all else equal, a lower growth rate. This negative impact is mea-
sured to be more important for smaller rms. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine
(2008) adopt a strategy  a la Rajan and Zingales (1998), and show that industries that are
technologically more dependent on small rms grow more in countries that are nancially
better developed.1 These two papers, taken together, tend to show that nancial constraints
1They calculate the share of rms below 20 employees in total sectoral employment in the US, and use the
ranking of US industries as a benchmark to dene the \technological dependence on small rms" of a given
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obstacles. Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer (2011) use survey data on rms in emerging countries
and show that nancial constraints restrain more innovation for smaller and younger rms.
Two other papers investigate directly the heterogeneity of nancial constraints, by esti-
mating the sensitivity of rm-level investment to cash ow for rms of dierent sizes. Follow-
ing Modigliani and Miller (1958), the underlying idea is that investment should not depend
on rm-level internal nancing capacity when nancial markets are frictionless. A positive
correlation between investment and cash ow is then interpreted as evidence of nancial con-
straints, and a bigger coecient for smaller rms would be interpreted as a sign of tougher
credit constraints for smaller rms. Kadapakkam, Kumar, and Riddick (1998), and Audretsch
and Elston (2002), do not nd such a heterogeneity for 6 OECD countries and for Germany
respectively. However, in both studies, the results might be due to the small number of
observations and to an over-representation of big rms.
Regarding nancial constraints in France, Bach (2011) analyzes a specic targeted loans
program. He exploits both an exogenous increase in available liquidities and an extension of
the program to the retail sector, previously ineligible. He shows that following the positive
liquidity shock, newly eligible rms increased more than the others their externally nanced
debt. This increase is not attributable to substitution between subsidized and non subsidized
debt, and the returns on subsidized debt appear to be higher than market cost of this debt.
The program reform did not induce signicant increase in the default risk of subsidized rms.
These results demonstrate the existence of credit constraints for small rms in France.
I depart from these papers along two dimensions. First, they are focused on the measure
of specic credit constraints for smaller rms and on their impact on macroeconomic growth,
while I am interested in the role of heterogeneous credit constraints on the rm size-growth
relationship. Second, in these papers, it is implicitly assumed that if small rms are dispro-
portionately credit constrained, this should be true for all sectors. However, loaners might
consider size as a determinant for the obtention of external credits dierently across sectors,
depending on the competitive environment in the industry or on the maturity of the sector for
example. I will thus distinguish in the analysis French industrial sectors with homogeneous
credit constraints and sectors with heterogeneous credit constraints.
2.3 Firm-level size, trade and investment
The fact that exporting rms are on average bigger and more productive than domestic ones is
now well documented. The literature has long tried to asses whether this export premium was
a cause (selection) or a consequence (learning by exporting) of activities on foreign markets
(e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Melitz, 2003; Van Biesebroeck, 2005; De Loecker, 2007).
More recently, the emphasis has been put on the joint decision of rms to invest and export.
sector.
6Costantini and Melitz (2008), Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Aw, Roberts, and Xu (2011)
show for example that the decision to enter on export markets might be correlated with the
decision to make product or process innovation, since exporting rms benet from a larger
market on which to amortize their investment.
Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Treer (2010) investigate the heterogeneity of this joint
decision along the rm-level productivity/size dimension. Bustos (2011) builds a model  a la
Melitz in which she introduces a technology choice. She nds that initially more productive
and bigger rms are more likely to both invest in the \high" technology and export, and con-
rms empirically these results studying Argentinian rms' response to MERCOSUR. Lileeva
and Treer (2010) assume in their theoretical framework that rms dier both in terms of ini-
tial size/productivity and, for a given size, in terms of marginal returns to investment. There
are xed export and investment costs. In the presence of this two dimensional heterogeneity,
they show that following a trade liberalization episode, productivity gains are concentrated
among initially smaller new exporters. This helps them rationalize their empirical ndings
about Canadian rms : following the CUSFTA trade liberalization, initially smaller and less
productive Canadian new exporters experienced higher labor productivity gains and invested
more than other new exporters.
The focus of this paper is dierent. I use French rm-level data from 1996 to 2002. I
do not address the issue of simultaneous decision of exporting and investing.2 However, I
show in a very general theoretical framework that the relationship between rm-level size and
investment depends on the relative concavity of three elements with respect to size: rm-level
prots, post-investment size and investment cost. I believe this framework can be useful to
understand cross-country dierences that appear in Bustos (2011) and Lileeva and Treer
(2010) for example. I actually show in the empirical part of the paper that the existence
of heterogeneous credit constraints, which impact on the concavity of the investment cost
function, allows to understand cross-sectoral dierences in the relationship between rm-level
size and investment/growth in France.
3 Theoretical framework
I present in this section a simple theoretical framework that emphasizes the forces determining
the relationship between rm-level size and investment, and through investment, rm-level
growth.
3.1 General framework
There are two periods, 0 and 1. Firms draw in period 0 their initial size 0 from a distribution
G(0). At that time, they can also decide to make a capacity enhancing investment I(0)
2No natural experiment of trade liberalization is exploitable in France over this period.
7which will increase their size in period 1 following a function :
1 = [I(:);0] (1)
with
@[I(:)]
@I(:) > 0. In most models in industrial economics, rm-level sales, employment
and prots are entirely determined by a cost or productivity parameter specic to the rm.
However, since I am interested here in the size-investment and size-growth relationship issue, I
prefer dealing with rm-level size (in terms of sales or employment) rather than productivity.
I focus on rms that are present in both periods, and thus do not deal with entry and exit in
the industry.
Firms are assumed to be rational and to evolve in an environment with perfect information;
there is no uncertainty. Optimizing rms choose their level of investment in period 0 by
maximizing their total expected prot in period 1:
(1) = (1)   C[I(:);0]
= [(I(:);0)]   C[I(:);0] (2)
where C[I(:);0] is the total cost of investment I(0) for a rm with nitial size 0. The












[I(:);0] = 0 (3)
The nature of the relationship between initial size 0 and optimal investment I(0) is then























If marginal returns to investment in terms of overall prot increase with rm-level initial
size, i.e. @2
@I(:)@0(1) > 0, initially bigger rms will invest more and grow more. On the
opposite, if marginal returns to investment in terms of overall prot decrease with rm-level
initial size, i.e. @2
@I(:)@0(1) < 0, initially smaller rms will invest more and grow more. It
is now important to identify the possible determinants of the concavity or convexity of total
prots with respect to initial size.
83.2 Determinants of the relationship between rm-level initial size and
investment
Three basic assumptions are made:
  @
@[(I(:);0)] > 0: prots increase with rm-level size.
  @
@I(:)[I(:);0] > 0: for a given initial size, rm-level size in period 1 increases with the
amount of investment made by the rm in period 0. This ensures that rms that invest
more grow more.
  @
@0[I(:);0] > 0: for a given amount of investment, rm-level size in period 1 increases
with rm-level initial size.
Given these assumptions, three main elements determine the shape of the relationship
between rm-level initial size and investment:
  The concavity of operating prots with respect to size, given by @2
@2[(I(:);0)].
It can be linked to preferences or to technology of production. For a given technology,
if we assume that bigger rms are more productive and produce cheaper varieties,
as in Hopenhayn (1992) for example, bigger (smaller) rms will tend to have greater
incentives to invest if demand increases more and more (less and less) rapidly when price
decreases, . In the same vein, for a given demand function, bigger (smaller) rms will
have greater incentives to invest if the marginal cost of production increases less and less
(more and more) rapidly with size. The overall concavity/convexity of operating prots
with respect to size depends on the interaction between demand and supply conditions.
  The shape of marginal returns to investment in terms of size, given by @2
@I(:)@0[(I(:);0)].
This term is linked to the investment technology. When this term is positive (negative),
the investment technology is such that the increase in size generated by one unit of
investment is higher for initially bigger (smaller) rms. In this case, initially bigger
(smaller) rms will have more incentives to invest.
  The concavity of the investment cost function, given by @2C
@I(:)@0[I(:);0]. If for a
given amount of investment, marginal cost of investment decreases (increases) with size,
initially bigger (smaller) rms will have, all else equal, greater incentives to invest. If any
dierence exists between small and big rms in terms of marginal cost of investment, the
most plausible conjecture is that marginal cost of investment decreases with rm-level
size. Bigger rms might obtain for example better prices from their technology suppliers
because they represent a larger market for them. Credit constraints, when they bind
disproportionately on small rms, also explain why the marginal cost of investment
might be higher for initially smaller rms.
9To sum up, in a framework where initial size is the only exogenous source of heterogene-
ity, the relationship between rm-level initial size, investment and growth depends on three
elements: operating prots, investment technology and investment cost. The shape of these
three functions with respect to initial rm-level size determines the concavity/convexity of
the total prot function. Depending on the sign and the magnitude of the forces at play, a
positive, a negative or an absence of relationship between initial size and investment/growth
is possible. This approach provides a dierent perspective on the issue of the submodularity
or supermodularity of prots studied by Mrazova and Neary (2011). They analyze the way
rms choose to serve a market (FDI, R&D etc.) and show that initially more ecient rms
will engage in the lower market-access cost alternative if and only if rm-level prot function
is supermodular in production and market-access cost. I detail here the forces that determine
this sub/supermodularity, focusing on the case of capacity investment. Identifying the shape
of these forces and their overall impact is then a matter of empirics.
3.3 Testable predictions
This is actually what I want to show in this paper, by testing the two following predictions
of the theoretical framework:
  Result 1: when operating prots are concave with respect to size, and when marginal
returns to investment (in terms of size) and marginal cost of investment are the same for
all rms, initially smaller rms invest more and grow more, all else equal, than bigger
ones.
  Result 2: this negative relationship is attenuated, or even reversed, when credit con-
straints bind disproportionately on small rms.




This implies that the overall prot function is submodular, i.e. 2
I(:)0[I(:);0]<0. On the
other hand, assuming that investment is externally nanced, the marginal cost of investment
decreases with size when credit constraints bind disproportionately on small rms. This can
be due for example to higher interest rates applied to small rms, which are seen by in-
vestors as more risky than the others: 2C
I(:)0[I(:);0]<0, so that 2
I(:)0[I(:);0] increases
and becomes positive for high enough degree of heterogeneity of credit constraints.
3.4 Theoretical framework and existing literature
It is worth noting that this simple framework is rich enough to reconcile apparently conicting
results obtained in the literature. For example, in Bustos (2011), several elements generate
the positive relationship between rm-level initial size and technology adoption she obtains:
10  She assumes CES preferences and xed marginal cost of production 1
, so that rm-level
operating prots are of the form A 1, where A>0 and >1. Firm-level prots are
concave ( @2
@2[(I(:);0)]<0) for <2 and convex ( @2
@2[(I(:);0)]>0) for >2.
  She models a discrete technology choice between a high and a low technology in which
marginal productivity gains from investment in the high technology are higher for ini-
tially more productive rms. Indeed, I(.) is a dummy in this case, and when it is equal
to 1, she assumes that [I(:);0]=0, with  > 1, so that @2
@I(:)@0[(I(:);0)]= 1>0.
  On the contrary, the cost of investment in the high technology as compared to the low
technology is assumed to be the same for all rms, equal to (   1)f, where f is the
xed production cost under the low technology and  > 1, so that @2C
@I(:)@0[I(:);0]=0.
Functional forms are such that in the end, the convexity of the relationship between ini-
tial and post-investment productivities dominates the potential concavity of operating prots,
implying that @2
@I(:)@0(1)>0 whatever .
Lileeva and Treer (2010) obtain the opposite prediction in a model featuring a dichoto-
mous investment choice too. However, in their framework, for a given initial productivity,
rms are also heterogeneous in terms of marginal returns to investment they can expect.
There are thus two sources of heterogeneity: rms increase their productivity thanks to in-
vestment ( @
@I(:)[I(:);0] > 0), but for a given investment decision, there is no systematic
relationship between initial productivity and post-investment productivity ( @
@0[I(:);0]=0
if I(.)=1). The link between marginal returns to investment and initial eciency is conse-
quently undetermined ( @2
@I(:)@0[I(:);0]=0). Finally, the marginal cost of investment is the
same for all the rms: @2C
@I(:)@0[I(:);0]=0. The negative relationship they obtain between
initial productivity and productivity gains thus derives entirely from the selection mechanism
on export market and from the second source of heterogeneity they introduce: following trade
liberalization, new exporters are the rms that can pass the new (lower) export threshold.
Among them, some have invested to pass this threshold, while it was not protable before:
the rms that were further from the new threshold threshold are those that experienced the
higher growth.
4 Shape of credit constraints, rms size distribution and shape
of prots function in France
I now turn to one possible application of the theoretical framework I propose, the explanation
of cross-sectoral dierences in the rm size-investment and the rm-size growth relationship
11by heterogeneous credit constraints. As a rst step, this section presents the data I use, and
then analyses the shape of credit constraints and of prots in French manufacturing industries.
4.1 The data
I use the French \Enqu^ etes annuelles d'entreprises" (EAE, Annual Business Surveys), pro-
vided by the French ministry of Industry. The data set covers all rms with more than
20 employees, and smaller rms with sales higher than 5 millions euros. It comprises all
balance-sheet data (production, value added, employment, capital, exports, aggregate wages,
investment etc.) and information about rm location, rm industry classication and rm
structure (number of plants, etc.). I have data from 1996 to 2004.
I conserve in the sample rms from continental France3 and from manufacturing industries,
with more than 10 employees. All my results about size must thus be interpreted as valid
above this threshold. Having a sample restrained to rms bigger than 10 employees implies
that the analysis mainly covers rms mature enough to pass this threshold: this ensures that
size does not capture eects that would be in reality related to age (see Haltiwanger, Jarmin,
and Miranda, 2010).
Value added and sales are deated by a branch-specic value-added price index, inputs
by a branch-specic inputs price index, and capital and investment by a gross xed capital
formation price index common to all manufacturing industries. To calculate Tfp, I estimate
production functions at the 2-digit industry level following the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
methodology (see Appendix A).
4.2 Identication of heterogeneous credit constraints
There exists a vast literature on the identication of credit constraints. The majority of
papers identify the existence of credit constraints thanks to the estimation of a Euler invest-
ment equation (see, e.g., Love, 2003; Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay, 2003; Harrison,
Love, and McMillan, 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009; Poncet, Steingress, and Vanden-
bussche, 2010). This method has been questioned, as illustrated by the controversy between
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000). However, in the
absence of direct measures of rm-level nancial constraints, it is still extensively used. It
is based on a dynamic model of the rm value optimization and interprets the sensitivity of
rm-level investment to internal level of cash-ow as a measure for credit constraints. Fol-
lowing Modigliani and Miller (1958), the underlying idea is that in the absence of nancial
constraints, rm-level investment should not depend on its internal level of cash-ow. Conse-
quently, a positive relationship between investment and cash-ow is interpreted as diculties
for rms to nd external nance; in this case, they are said to be credit-constrained.
3That is to say overseas d epartements and Corsica excluded.
12I estimate an augmented Euler equation to test for the existence of heterogeneous credit
constraints depending on rm size. Indeed, it might be the case that small rms are more
subject to credit constraints, due to higher sensitivity to business cycles or to absence of
collateral to oer to banks. The existence of such heterogeneous credit constraints has been







































+ t + it (5)
where I
K is the level of investment of rm i scaled by the level of assets at time t, Sales
K
is the ratio of sales to assets of rm i, L is employment of rm i and CF
K is the ratio of cash
ow to assets of rm i. Lagged value of I
K and its square account for the (potentially non
linear) dynamic structure of the investment model, Sales
K is a proxy for the protability of
the rm (the higher the ratio of sales to capital, the more protable the rm) and CF
K is an
index of liquidities available within the rm.4 Consequently, the parameter  will capture
average credit constraints in the sample: a positive and signicant correlation between rm-
level investment in t and available internal liquidities the year before will indicate diculties
for rms to access external nance. However, our parameter of interest is . Indeed, if 
turns out to be insignicant, it will mean that credit constraints are homogeneous across
rms. On the contrary, a negative and signicant  will indicate that the bigger the rm, the
less credit constrained they are. What is important here is not that credit constraints exist
or not within a sector, but that these credit constraints are the same for all rms, or on the
opposite that they disproportionately bind on small rms.
The Euler equation is estimated separately for each 2-digit industry, allowing the shape of
credit constraints to dier across sectors. There are several reasons why the shape of credit
constraints may not be the same across sectors within the same country: the asymmetries in
terms of information about the nancial health of rms may not be the same across sectors,
the degree of competition within the industry might impact on the access of small rms to
external nance, sectors might be heterogeneous in terms of collateralizable assets etc. For
example, Standard & Poor's acknowledge the fact that smaller rms are generally perceived
negatively because they tend to benet less from economies of scale and to be less diversied
(and thus more risky). However, they also state that size is weighted dierently in their rating
grids depending on industry determinants such as the market structure or the maturity of
the sector. Size might consequently not necessarily be a disadvantage5
4Cash-ow is dened as follows: CF = Sales-Wages+Amortizement.
5\Corporate Ratings Criteria", 2008, Standard & Poor's.
13I present in Appendix B more details on the estimation of this equation. The classication
of industries obtained with the Euler equation is presented in Table 1. It is robust to dier-
ent estimation strategies (no xed eects, industry-year xed eects, rm-level xed eects,
industry-year and rm-level xed eects, GMM estimations yielding unreliable results), to
alternative time-structure (including rm-level employment at time t   1 instead of t) and
to alternative specications (in particular the accelerator-prot model, also used in Konings,
Rizov, and Vandenbussche (2003) and Harrison, Love, and McMillan (2004) for example).
Table 1: Heterogeneous credit constraints-Classication of 2-digit industries





Printing/Publishing Non electric machines
Metals Electric machines




4.3 Shape of credit constraints and rm size distribution
No direct intuition allows to rationalize the classication of industries that emerges from the
estimation of credit constraints by sector (maturity or capital-intensity of sectors, competition
etc.). This is not so surprising given the multiplicity of possible determinants of the shape of
credit constraints. However, the idea that this classication correctly captures cross-sectoral
dierences in the shape of credit constraints is supported by the analysis of rm-size dis-
tribution within sectors. Indeed, in sectors where small rms are disproportionately credit
constrained, we expect rms at the bottom of the distribution to be relatively smaller with
respect to the average in the industry than in sectors where credit constraints are homoge-
neous. On the opposite, we expect the relative size of rms at the top of the distribution to
be bigger in sectors with heterogeneous credit constraints than in sectors with homogenous
credit constraints.
This is exactly the pattern described in Tables 2 for rm-level employment. For each 2-
digit sector and each category of rms, domestic or exporters (dened as rms declaring more
than 50,000 euros of exports), rm-level relative size is calculated by computing the ratio for
year 1996 of rm-level employment to rm-level average employment in the industry and rms'
category. Firms are then divided into quantiles of relative size (still at the industry and rms'
14Table 2: Firm-level relative size distribution in 1996: Employment
Homog. cred. const. ind. Heterog. cred. const. ind.
Percent. Domestic Exporters Domestic Exporters
10 0.44 0.21 0.37 0.13
25 0.53 0.29 0.45 0.19
50 0.69 0.44 0.60 0.33
75 0.98 0.92 0.87 0.82
90 1.62 1.97 1.59 1.90
95 2.30 3.35 2.54 3.50
Note: The table reads as follows: in 1996, the 10th percentile of the
ratio of rm-level employment to industry-level rm average
employment is equal, on average, to 44% for domestic rms
in industries where credit constraints are homogenous, and to
37% for domestic rms in industries where small rms are dis-
proportionately credit-constrained. Exporting rms are rms
declaring exports bigger than 50 000 euros.
category level). The average value of dierent quantiles of domestic and exporting rms is
calculated separately for industries with homogenous et heterogeneous credit constraints. Two
important regularities appear. First, whatever the shape of credit constraints, the relative size
of exporters at the bottom of the distribution is smaller that the relative size of their domestic
counterparts, while the opposite is true for exporters at the top of the size distribution.
This nding is coherent with the results obtained by di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Ranciere
(2010); they show, also on French data, that if we approximate rm-size distribution by a
Pareto distribution, the shape parameter of the Pareto is smaller for exporting rms than for
domestic ones, implying a stronger size dispersion for exporters. More importantly, statistics
in Table 2 show that for both domestic and exporting rms, rms at the bottom of the
distribution are relatively bigger in industries where credit constraints are homogeneous than
is sectors where credit constraints aect small rms disproportionately. On the opposite, rms
at the top of the distribution are relatively smaller in industries where credit constraints are
homogeneous. Moreover, in sectors with homogenous credit constraints, domestic rms at
the 95th percentile of the distribution are 5.23 times larger than domestic rms at the 1st
decile, vs 6.86 in sectors with heterogeneous credit constraints (resp. 16 and 27 for exporters).
This suggests that rm-level relative size distribution is more right-skewed in industries with
heterogeneous credit constraints.
Altogether, these elements are coherent with the idea that industries identied as ex-
hibiting disproportionate credit constraints for small rms are indeed industries where small
rms are relatively less able to develop as compared to big rms, leading to a distribution of
rm-level size that is more right-skewed.
The picture is the same if we consider sales (see Table 3) or value added (see Appendix C)
15as a proxy for size.
Table 3: Firm-level relative size distribution: Sales
Homog. cred. const. ind. Heterog. cred. const. ind.
Percent. Domestic Exporters Domestic Exporters
10 0.26 0.11 0.19 0.07
25 0.35 0.17 0.27 0.11
50 0.53 0.32 0.41 0.22
75 0.85 0.70 0.73 0.57
90 1.52 1.63 1.45 1.52
95 2.25 3.03 2.31 2.86
Note: The table reads as follows: in 1996, the 10th percentile of
the ratio of rm-level sales to industry-level rm average sales
is equal, on average, to 26% for domestic rms in industries
where credit constraints are homogenous, and to 19% for do-
mestic rms in industries where small rms are disproportion-
ately credit-constrained. Exporting rms are rms declaring
exports bigger than 50 000 euros.
4.4 Concavity of operating prots
Dierences in the shape of nancial constraints across sectors can be interpreted as dierences
in the shape of marginal cost of investment. However, I have shown in Section 3 that size-
investment and size-growth relationships are also determined by the shape of prots with
respect to size. I thus now investigate whether the shape of operating prots diers across



























 lnTfpijt + lnKijt  lnTfpijt + djt + ijt (6)
where it is prots of rm i from industry j at time t, dened as the fraction of value




ijt, prots are supposed to depend on the quantity of capital K used by the rm and on
rm-level Tfp. Investments made by the rm might be either capacity-enhancing, increasing
the capital stock, or productivity-enhancing, increasing the level of Tfp. I thus investigate
non-linearities in the eect of capital stock and Tfp on rm-level prots by including quadratic
terms of control variables. Bilateral interactions of capital to labor ratio, capital stock and
Tfp are also included to keep the estimated prot function exible. This amounts to estimate
16a Taylor approximation of the prots function. The regression includes 3-digit industry-year
xed eects, so that the impact of each variable is estimated by comparing, for a given year,
rms within the same industry.
Table 4: Concavity of rm-level prots
Dependent Variable: ln Y-Wages
Domestic rms Exporting rms
Homog. cred. const. Heterog. cred. const. Homog. cred. const. Heterog. cred. const.
ln K
L -0.172 -0.542a -0.049 -0.297a
(0.125) (0.083) (0.065) (0.046)
ln2 K
L -0.094a -0.012 -0.026a 0.004
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
ln K 1.001a 0.952a 0.745a 0.741a
(0.055) (0.056) (0.036) (0.026)
ln2 K -0.039a -0.032a -0.003 -0.012a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
ln Tfp 3.526a 3.145a 3.465a 3.485a
(0.134) (0.154) (0.082) (0.089)
ln2 Tfp -0.187a -0.194a -0.193a -0.229a
(0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.012)
ln K  ln Tfp 0.011 0.035b 0.014 0.048a
(0.012) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008)
ln K
L  ln Tfp -0.144a -0.074a -0.096a -0.068a
(0.028) (0.023) (0.020) (0.011)
ln K  ln K
L 0.103a 0.051a 0.007 0.002
(0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.005)
N 39448 20508 51927 49168
R2 0.791 0.869 0.897 0.929
hline N 39448 20508 51927 49168
R2 0.791 0.869 0.897 0.929
Note: Industry 3-digit-Year xed eects are included in all the regressions. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. a, b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
The regression is run separately for domestic rms and exporters. Again, exporters are
dened as rms exporting more than 50,000 euros in a given year. We use a denition based
on the amount of exports, and not on the share of exports in total sales. Indeed, the idea is
that exporters might dier from domestic rms due to the presence of xed export costs or
due to bigger sales on which to amortize investments.6 It is thus the value of exports that
matters and not their relative size as compared to domestic sales.
Results are presented in Table 4 and in Figures 1 to 4. For domestic rms, prots are
concave in capital and Tfp: the coecient on the square of capital and Tfp is always neg-
ative and signicant. Moreover, the coecients obtained on the quadratic terms are not
signicantly dierent across both types of industries. These results suggest that whatever
the shape of credit constraints in the industry, prots have the same concavity, providing the
same incentives to invest for rms. As far as prots are concerned, smaller domestic rms
have higher incentives to invest than big ones, which should translate into higher growth rates
for initially smaller domestic rms over a given period. Assessing whether the concavity of
6Exports coming in addition to domestic sales, as in most models of international trade.
17prots is due to technology or preferences, as emphasized in Section 3, is beyond the scope
of this paper.
Prots of exporters are much less concave in capital than prots of domestic rms: con-
ditioning on the shape of credit constraints, the coecient obtained on the square of capital
stock, even though negative, is much smaller, in absolute value, for exporters than for domes-
tic rms. This is coherent with the fact that exports activities are associated with xed costs
linked to the search of trading partners or with the adaptation of products to the tastes of
foreign consumers (Melitz, 2003); bigger exporters will better amortize the xed exports costs
and will hence be more protable. Some scope economies across destinations and/or products
might also boost the protability of big exporters. These scale economies might attenuate
the concavity of prots. As a consequence, the negative relationship between rm-level size
and investment/growth should be less intense for exporters than for domestic rms.
Moreover, prots of exporters are more concave in sectors with heterogeneous credit con-
straints, the coecient on the square of capital stock being not signicant for exporters
belonging to industries with homogenous credit constraints. Consequently, for exporters, the
shape of prots and the shape of marginal cost of investment play in opposite directions:
we can thus expect dierences in the size-investment and size-growth relationship to be less
important across sectors for exporters than for domestic rms.
5 Size-investment and size-growth relationship
I now turn to the analysis of the size-investment and size-growth relationship for domestic
and exporting rms in the both types of industries identied in Section 4.
5.1 Empirical strategy
I analyze, for a given rm, the determinants of average investment and performance growth
between 1996 and 2002. I consequently focus on rms that remain active over this relatively
long period of time (7 years). I restrict the analysis to the period 1996-2002 to conserve
more rms in the sample. However, all results are qualitatively the same if I consider rms
remaining active from 1996 to 2004.7 My approach is dierent from Neumark, Wall, and
Zhang (2011) and Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2010): they analyze yearly variations
of employment within cells of rms of dierent sizes, and they thus take into account both
employment variations of stayers and employment losses due to rms' deaths. Here, I am
interested in the behavior of stayers only, as in Lileeva and Treer (2010) and Bustos (2011).
A two-step empirical strategy is adopted. An investment function over the period 1996-
2002 is rst estimated. In the theoretical framework, rms take into account expected prots
in period 1 to choose their optimal investment in period 0, expected sales being determined by
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Figure 4: Exporting rms - Concavity in Tfp 20their initial size draw and their level of investment. Combining these insights with methods































i1997 2002 is the log of the average annual investment of rm i, from sector
j, over the period 1997-2002.Average investment over the period is equal to the total amount
of investment made by a rm between 1997 and 2002 divided by the number of observations
for this rm over the same period (see Section 5.2 below). Hence, there is in the sample one
observation per rm. A literature exists on the nature of investment adjustment costs at
the plant-level (convex, non-convex, irreversible) and their implications on aggregate invest-
ment (see, e.g., Caballero, 1999; Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006). However, in contrast with
these works, I am not interested here in the characterization of the dynamics of investment
(spikes, bursts, sensitivity to shocks). I am rather focusing on how the average annual quan-
tity of investment over a given period of time is related to initial rm-level characteristics,
independently of rm-level investment path.
Average annual investment of rm i over the period 1997-2002 is thus explained by rm-
level characteristics in 1996. As in the Euler equation, investment in 1996 is included to take
into account persistency in investment behavior. Sales and cash ow to capital ratios control
for rm-level protability and availability of internal funds. Firm-level investment might also
depend on the size of the market and on competitive pressure in the industry, which are
controlled for by sectoral xed eects dj, dened at the 3-digit industry level. The impact
of these determinants are thus estimated thanks to cross-sectional variations within a given
industry.
 is the coecient of interest; it measures the correlation between rm-level size, mea-
sured by employment, and investment, having controlled for rm-level investment persistency,
protability and cash-ow, and for sectoral determinants of investment over the period. This
equation is estimated separately for domestic and exporting rms, and for each category of
rms, separately for industries in which credit constraints are homogeneous and for industries
in which small rms are disproportionately credit constrained.
I then analyze how rm-level performance growth varies with initial size. Again, the
regression is run separately for domestic and exporting rms and for industries with dierent
shapes of credit constraints.
For a performance index y, the baseline regression brought to data is the following:
21lnyij1996 2004 = lnyi1996 + lnLi1996 + dj + i (8)
Some other characteristics, correlated with rm-level employment, could impact on rm-
level investment and performance growth, and bias the estimation of . I thus also control
for rm-level initial TFP (empirically positively correlated, but not collinear, with size) and
rm-level average wage in 1996, used as a proxy for average skills of employees.
5.2 Construction of the sample and descriptive statistics
Given the empirical methodology I adopt, the sample used for the regressions is a specic
subsample of the initial French Annual Business Surveys.
More precisely, after basic checks (exclusion of observations with missing or negative
employment, capital, value added and investment) and having removed rms that change
industry (at the 2-digit level) or which have less than 10 employees on average over the period,
there are 20,198 observations in 1996 corresponding to rms operating in manufacturing
industries and located in continental France (vs 21,743 rms in the raw data). I then conserve
in the sample rms for which there are observations in 1996, 1997, 2001 and 2002. This ensures
that only the rms that stay on the market over the period remain in the sample. These four
years will be moreover necessary to identify domestic and exporting rms (see below). After
this step, 12,720 rms are present in the sample. Then, in order to be sure that average
rm-level investment is calculated on a sucient number of observations, I drop the rms for
which we have less than 5 observations over the 7-year period under study. In the end, the
sample is composed of 12,703 rms.
Table 5 compares the sample of rms used for the estimations to the rms that disappear
before 2002 and which are dropped from the sample. Not surprisingly, rms in our nal sample
are bigger in terms of employment, sales, exports and value added than manufacturing rms
which disappear before 2002. Their labour productivity is also higher. This is true whatever
the shape of nancial constraints. In the end, rms in the nal sample represent 60% to 66%
of rms active in 1996, and 66% to 70% of total employment and value added.
5.3 Denition of export status
The denition of rm-level export status over the period is not trivial, due to multiple entries
and exits on export markets for the same given rm. I hence adopt the following conventions:
  a rm is said to export in a given year if it declares exports bigger than 50,000 euros.
This ensures that negligible export ows are not taken into account to dene the export
status of the rm.8 Note however that all the results are robust if I consider that rms
8Note that rm-level intra-EU exports must be bigger than 100,000 euros in total to be recorded in Customs
data. The threshold I apply on the Annual Business surveys is thus not much conservative. 50,000 euros is
equal to the 13th centile of the distribution of exports in the sample used for regressions.
22Table 5: Descriptive statistics - Year 1996
Homogenous credit constraints




Value added 4203.38 3138.86
Labour productivity 36.55 34.63
Share in total employment 66.14 33.86
Share in total sales 64.57 35.43
Share in total exports 62.02 37.98
Share in total value added 67.34 32.66
Number of rms 7157 4648
Share in total number of rms 60.63 39.37
Heterogeneous credit constraints




Value added 9481.90 8203.84
Labour productivity 43.20 39.15
Share in total employment 69.33 30.67
Share in total sales 66.52 33.48
Share in total exports 66.82 33.18
Share in total value added 69.24 30.76
Number of rms 5546 2854
Share in total number of rms 66.08 33.92
Note: Monetary values are in thousands euros.
23are exporting in a given year as soon as they declare positive exports.9
  a rm is said to be domestic at the beginning of the period is it does not export neither
in 1996 nor in 1997. It is said to be domestic at the end of the period if it does not
export neither in 2001 nor in 2002.
  the symmetric is true to dene exporters at the beginning and at the end of the period.
Based on these denitions, four mutually exclusive categories of rms can be identied:
continuing domestic rms which do not export neither at the beginning nor at the end of the
period (2,683 rms), switching rms, which are domestic at the beginning and exporters at
the end of the period (640 rms), continuing exporters, which export both at the beginning,
and at the end of the period (6,642 ms) and ceasing exporters, which export at the beginning
of the period but are domestic at the end of the period (385 rms). A fth category, alternate
exporters, are rms which export status sequences at the beginning and at the end of the
period does not allow to classify them in one of the four preceding categories (2,353 rms).
Continuing domestic rms, switching exporters and alternate exporters are pooled to-
gether in the category of \initially domestic rms", while continuing exporters and ceasing
exporters form the group of \initially exporting rms".
5.4 Firm-level investment and initial size
I rst analyze the relationship between initial size and rm-level average annual investment.
For initially domestic rms, results presented in Table 6 show that whatever the shape of
credit constraints, rm-level protability (measured by the sales to capital ratio) and rm-level
internal liquidities (measured by the cash ow to capital ratio) have, as expected, a positive
and signicant coecient. Firm-level investment also exhibits persistency since the initial
investment to capital ratio is positively related to average annual investment the years after.
Moreover, all else equal, switching exporters invest much more than continuing domestic rms
(from 25% to 37.5% more depending on the type of industry and the specication). This is
consistent with papers by Lileeva and Treer (2010) and Bustos (2011) showing that entry on
export markets is associated with rm-level investment. Alternate exporters are also shown,
but to a lesser extent, to invest more than domestic rms.
More importantly, the rst column of Table 6 shows that all else equal, rm-level annual
investment and initial size are signicantly negatively correlated in industries where credit
constraints are homogeneous. In these industries, a 10% increase in rm-level employment
decreases, all else equal, average annual investment by around 1%. In column 2, rm-level
9Results available upon request.
24Tfp and average wage in 1996 are included, as well as a dummy identifying continuing do-
mestic rms that exported at least once over the period (i.e. in 1998, 1999 or 2000, to control
for potential surplus of investment by occasional exporters).10 The intensity and the signi-
cancy of the negative relationship between rm-level employment and investment is roughly
unaected. On the opposite, the last two columns of Table 6 show that there is no statisti-
cally signicant relationship between rm-level initial size and investment. Consequently, for
initially domestic rms, the prediction of the theoretical framework is veried: small rms in-
vest more, all else equal, than bigger ones, in sectors where credit constraints are homogenous
only. When small rms are disproportionately credit constrained, this negative relationship
is attenuated and becomes insignicant.




Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln I
Ki1996 0.209a 0.208a 0.214a 0.207a
(0.024) (0.025) (0.038) (0.037)
Ln Sales
K i1996 0.306a 0.276a 0.342a 0.331a
(0.027) (0.036) (0.070) (0.073)
Ln CF
K i1996 0.394a 0.453a 0.298a 0.328a
(0.070) (0.094) (0.056) (0.092)
Switching exporters 0.249a 0.284a 0.375a 0.358a
(0.063) (0.064) (0.057) (0.055)
Alternate exporters 0.054 0.098c 0.165a 0.160a
(0.051) (0.050) (0.044) (0.046)
Ln Li1996 -0.105a -0.094a -0.035 -0.026
(0.023) (0.021) (0.039) (0.052)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.167c -0.033
(0.097) (0.205)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 -0.229c -0.484b
(0.131) (0.194)
Occasional exporters 0.127a -0.165c
(0.045) (0.092)
Observations 3644 3644 1985 1985
R2 0.474 0.480 0.437 0.448
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
The picture is a bit dierent for initially exporting rms. As shown in Table 7, initial
investment, protability and internal cash ow have all the positive and signicant positive
coecient we expect. Ceasing exporters are shown to invest signicantly less, all else equal,
10These are dierent from alternate exporters, which are rms which cannot be classied as exporting or
domestic rms at the beginning and at the end of the period.
25than continuing exporters. This does not come as a surprise since those rms that exit from
export markets probably experience bad shocks that negatively aect their investment path.
This result is to a certain extent symmetric to the investment premium observed for switching
exporters as compared to other domestic rms. Regarding the size-investment relationship,
in industries where credit constraints are homogenous, no statistically signicant relationship
is detected. This remains true when Tfp, average wage and a dummy identifying continuing
exporters which exit export markets at least once over the period are controlled for. On the
opposite, when these three variables are included, a positive and signicant relationship be-
tween rm-level employment and investment is measured for exporters operating in industries
where small rms are more credit constrained.
Again, these results are in line with the theoretical framework provided in section 3. In
sectors where credit constraints are homogenous, due to the very weak concavity of rm-level
prots with respect to employment measured for exporters (cf Figure 2 above), no correlation
exists between rm-level employment and investment in this sample. On the opposite, as
predicted by the theoretical framework, the relationship tends to become positive in sectors
where small rms face tougher nancial constraints than bigger ones. Even though, for
exporters, prots are more concave with respect to size in industries with heterogeneous
credit constraints (see Figure 2), this is not enough to completely counterbalance the impact
of heterogeneous credit constraints on the size-investment relationship.
5.5 Firm-level growth and initial size
I now turn to the analysis of the relationship between rm-level performance growth and initial
size. I present results on employment and sales growth, while results on Tfp are displayed in
Appendix D.
Among initially domestic rms, employment growth of switching exporters is higher, all
else equal, than employment growth of continuing domestic rms, whatever the shape of credit
constraints within the industry. This is intuitive and coherent with the results obtained about
investment. The result of interest is the coecient on initial size in terms of employment. In
all cases, there is a negative and signicant relationship between initial size and employment
growth: smaller rms grow faster in terms of employment than bigger ones. However, in line
with the predictions of the theoretical framework, this convergence process is more rapid in
industries where credit constraints are homogenous than in industries where small rms are
more credit constrained. A 10% increase in rm-level initial employment is associated with a
1.5 to 1.7% decrease in rm-level employment growth in industries with homogeneous credit
constraints (depending on the on the controls included in the regression). In industries where
small rms are disproportionately credit constrained, the elasticity of employment growth to
initial size is lower in absolute value, comprised between 0.8 and 1.2%.
For initially exporting rms, we also observe in Table 9 a negative relationship between




Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln I
Ki1996 0.231a 0.230a 0.254a 0.247a
(0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.030)
Ln Sales
K i1996 0.294a 0.268a 0.209a 0.115b
(0.057) (0.062) (0.047) (0.052)
Ln CF
K i1996 0.294a 0.369a 0.399a 0.580a
(0.057) (0.059) (0.042) (0.082)
Ceasing exporters -0.245a -0.272a -0.178a -0.222a
(0.076) (0.071) (0.061) (0.056)
Ln Li1996 -0.005 0.020 0.003 0.083a
(0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.031)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.199 -0.401a
(0.124) (0.114)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 0.014 -0.137
(0.121) (0.133)
Occasional domestic rms -0.053 -0.102c
(0.057) (0.053)
Observations 3449 3449 3519 3519
R2 0.423 0.426 0.454 0.469
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
27Table 8: Firm-level employment growth- Domestic rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln Employmenti
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Li1996 -0.154a -0.168a -0.079a -0.120a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
Switching exporters 0.135a 0.134a 0.134a 0.124a
(0.017) (0.017) (0.034) (0.036)
Alternate exporters 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.012
(0.012) (0.013) (0.020) (0.018)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.149a 0.306a
(0.035) (0.051)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 -0.060 -0.237a
(0.048) (0.065)
Occasional exporters 0.020 -0.086a
(0.020) (0.025)
Observations 3678 3678 1998 1998
R2 0.075 0.088 0.029 0.076
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
initial size and employment growth, whatever the shape of credit constraints and the speci-
cation. For a given group of industries, the speed of convergence I measure among initially
exporting rms is lower than the speed of convergence measured among initially domestic
rms. This is explained by the fact that prots are less concave with respect to size for
exporting rms than for domestic ones (cf Figures 1 and 2 above). On the other hand, com-
parisons across groups of industries go in the same direction as for domestic rms: the speed
of convergence tends to be, all else equal, lower in industries where credit constraints are het-
erogeneous. However, now, the dierence across industries is not signicant. This is surely
explained by the greater concavity of exporters' prots in industries where credit constraints
are heterogeneous (cf Figure 2 above), which compensates the distorsion in the size-growth
relationship generated by the shape of marginal investment cost.
The analysis is very similar if we consider sales growth instead of employment growth.
In this case, size is proxied by initial sales and not by employment, both variables being
correlated at almost 90%. For domestic rms, the elasticity of rm sales growth to initial
sales is equal to -0.12 in industries where credit constraints are homogenous, whether rm-
level Tfp, average wages and occasional presence on export markets are controlled for or not.
It is equal to -0.08 only in industries where small rms face tougher credit constraints than
the others. Results go in the same direction when we focus on exporters, for which the speed
of convergence is also lower in industries with heterogeneous credit constraints.
Results on Tfp and value added growth are presented in Appendix D and are qualitatively
28Table 9: Firm-level employment growth- Initially exporting rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln Employmenti
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Li1996 -0.069a -0.079a -0.054a -0.077a
(0.014) (0.010) (0.005) (0.008)
Ceasing exporters -0.145a -0.121a -0.120b -0.119b
(0.028) (0.026) (0.047) (0.046)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.123b 0.182a
(0.052) (0.034)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 0.088 -0.209a
(0.090) (0.053)
Occasional domestic rms -0.018 -0.046
(0.030) (0.031)
Observations 3479 3479 3548 3548
R2 0.033 0.059 0.024 0.048
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
similar. Note also that the dierence across sectors in the coecient on the size variable is
always signicant at at least 10 %, except for investment of domestic rms (due to imprecision
of the estimate for sectors with heterogeneous credit constraints) and for employment-growth
of exporters (probably due to the shape of prots, as explained above).
To have some sense of the magnitude of the eects measured so far, let's compare the
growth rate of two rms, identical in all their characteristics except size: one has employment
and sales equal to the rst decile of the distribution while the other one is at the 9th decile.
If those two rms are domestic, based on the regressions results presented above, the growth
rate of employment and sales is respectively 26.45% and 27.39% higher for the smaller than
for the bigger one in sectors with homogenous credit constraints. These gures are equal
to 18.25% and 17.36% only in sectors with heterogeneous credit constraints. For exporters,
as suggested by the results, the growth dierential between big and small rms does not
vary across sectors for employment, but it does by 10 percentage points for sales (16.07%
in sectors with homogenous credit constraints vs 6.21% in sectors with heterogeneous credit
constraints).
5.6 The role of investment
In the theoretical framework, cross-sectoral variations in rm-level size-growth relationship are
explained by the investment behavior of rms, which is itself aected by the shape of nancial
constraints. To corroborate this mechanism, I must verify that once rm-level investment
29Table 10: Firm-level sales growth- Initially domestic rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln Salesi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Salesi1996 -0.118a -0.121a -0.077a -0.080a
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.018)
Switching exporters 0.202a 0.206a 0.187a 0.177a
(0.034) (0.035) (0.046) (0.049)
Alternate exporters 0.068a 0.073a 0.006 -0.000
(0.023) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.045 0.115
(0.038) (0.078)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 -0.074 -0.279b
(0.071) (0.110)
Occasional exporters 0.017 -0.080c
(0.024) (0.045)
Observations 3678 3678 1998 1998
R2 0.050 0.051 0.035 0.049
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
Table 11: Firm-level sales growth- Initially exporting rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln salesi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Salesi1996 -0.041a -0.047a -0.032a -0.019c
(0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Ceasing exporters -0.200a -0.203a -0.200a -0.205a
(0.037) (0.034) (0.055) (0.053)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.033 -0.010
(0.040) (0.037)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 -0.015 -0.176a
(0.068) (0.060)
Occasional domestic rms -0.040 -0.016
(0.035) (0.049)
Observations 3479 3479 3548 3548
R2 0.020 0.021 0.014 0.022
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
30has been accounted for, the heterogeneity across sectors in terms of size-growth relationship
vanishes, or is at least reduced. Results presented in Tables 12 and 13 actually validate the
investment channel. Indeed, they show that rm-level investment positively and signicantly
impacts on rm-level employment and sales growth. Moreover, after having controlled for
rm-level average annual investment over the period 1997-2002, the elasticity of rm-level
employment growth to initial size is the same whatever the shape of nancial constraints,
among both domestic and exporting rms. Regarding sales growth, for a given type of rms
in terms of export status, the cross-sectoral dierence in the intensity of the size-growth
relationship is also sharply reduced as compared to regressions where investment was not
controlled for (cf Tables 10 and 11). Note that for a given type of rms, the magnitude of the
correlation between rm-level growth and average annual investment is also very comparable
across sectors. Thus, the dierences across sectors observed so far cannot be explained by
dierences in terms of marginal returns to investment controlling for size or vice versa, i.e. by
dierences in the absolute value of the rst derivatives @
@I(:)[I(:);0] and @
@0[I(:);0] (which
also intervene in the determination of the rm size-investment relationship, see equation 4).
However, one last check must be made to be sure that heterogeneous credit constraints
mainly explain the cross-sectoral variations observed in France. In the theoretical framework,
the size-investment and the size-growth relationships have been shown to depend on three
main elements: the concavity of prots with respect to size, the relationship between marginal
returns to investment in terms of size and initial size and the relationship between marginal
cost of investment and initial size. If sectors where credit constraints are heterogeneous are
also sectors in which the marginal returns to investment in terms of size increase with initial
size, it might be the case that the heterogeneity across sectors in terms of size-investment
and size-growth relationship is due to the shape of marginal returns to investment, and not
to the shape of marginal cost of investment. I investigate this issue in Tables 14 and 15,
where I introduce both investment and the interaction between investment and initial size
in the growth analysis, in order to measure potential dierences across sectors in the shape
of marginal returns to investment in terms of size. If anything, what I nd is that marginal
returns to investment in terms of size are slightly higher for initially bigger rms in industries
where credit constraints are homogeneous only (interaction term between investment and
size positive and signicant). This result means that the negative relationship between rm-
level size and investment or growth I measure would be actually more intense in these latter
industries if marginal returns to investment were homogeneous across rms. This would
reinforce the cross-sectoral dierences in the intensity of the size-investment and the size-
growth relationships I already measure. I can thus safely claim that the fact that the negative
relationship between size and investment/growth is more intense in sectors with homogeneous
credit constraints than in sector with heterogeneous credit constraints is actually due to



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































33Table 14: Heterogeneous impact of investment on employment growth
Dependent Variable:  Ln Employmenti
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Li1996 -0.239a -0.494a -0.248a -0.333a
(0.009) (0.048) (0.015) (0.051)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 0.070b 0.070c 0.153a 0.152a
(0.034) (0.035) (0.027) (0.027)
Ln Avg Wage i1996 -0.046 -0.059 -0.221a -0.226a
(0.060) (0.061) (0.040) (0.039)
Investmenti1996 0.140a 0.063a 0.150a 0.125a
(0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015)
Investmenti1996  Li1996 0.019a 0.006c
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 7157 7157 5546 5546
R2 0.203 0.210 0.195 0.196
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
Table 15: Heterogeneous impact of investment on sales growth
Dependent Variable:  Ln Salesi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Salesi1996 -0.238a -0.364a -0.220a -0.282a
(0.012) (0.037) (0.023) (0.048)
LnLP Tfpi1996 0.066b 0.068b 0.047 0.047
(0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030)
LnAvg Wage i1996 0.018 0.031 -0.109c -0.108c
(0.059) (0.064) (0.057) (0.057)
Investmenti1996 0.186a 0.107a 0.179a 0.139a
(0.013) (0.019) (0.018) (0.026)
Investmenti1996  Ln Salesi1996 0.009a 0.004
(0.002) (0.003)
Observations 7157 7157 5546 5546
R2 0.174 0.176 0.160 0.161
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
345.7 Shape of credit constraints and small rms' contribution to growth
So far, the analysis so has been conducted at a micro level. It has however implications
at the macro level. In particular, a natural conclusion we can draw from the analysis is
that the shape of credit constraints will determine the share of SME's in aggregate growth:
all else equal, in sectors where credit constraints are homogenous, small and medium sized
rms should play a more important role in aggregate growth than in sectors where credit
constraints are heterogeneous. This is actually what I nd. Again, I focus on rms remaining
active over the period, and I do not consider employment and sales variations linked to rms'
entry and exit. Results in Table 16 show that employment in continuously active rms has
grown by 7.78% in industries where credit constraints are homogenous. On these 7.78%,
4.86 percentage point accrue to exporters and 2.92 percentage point to domestic rms. For
industries where credit constraints are heterogeneous, these gures are equal, respectively, to
7.43%, 4.83 pp and 2.60 pp.
Within each 3-digit industries, rms are then classied into quartiles of initial size. In
sectors where credit constraints are homogeneous, domestic rms whose employment in 1996
is below the median (in their industry) account for almost 60% of total employment growth of
domestic rms. In sectors where small rms are disproportionately credit constrained, rms
whose size is below the median account for a little bit more than 30% of domestic rms'
employment growth only. No such dierence appears for exporting rms. This is consistent
with our result that convergence in terms of employment among domestic rms is more rapid
in sectors where credit constraints are homogenous than in other manufacturing sectors, while
no such signicant dierence is detected for exporting rms.
On the whole sample of rms, rms whose initial employment is below the median account
for almost 45% of employment growth in sectors with homogenous credit constraints, vs 33%
in sectors where small rms face tougher nancial constraints than big rms.
Results are very similar when we consider sales growth. In industries where credit con-
straints are homogenous, rms with initial sales below the median in their sector account for
12.5% of sales growth between 1996 to 2002. In industries where small rms are more credit
constrained than the others, they account for 7% of sales growth only over the period.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper shows that the diverging results obtained in the literature on the rm size-growth
relationship can be reconciled in a very general theoretical framework featuring rm-level
heterogeneity and investment decision. Three main elements determine the nature and the
intensity of the relationship between rm-level size and investment: the shape of operating
prots with respect to size, the shape of marginal returns to investment (in terms of size) with
respect to initial size and the shape of marginal cost of investment with respect to size. Any
35Table 16: Credit constraints and industry-level employment growth 1996-2002
Homog. cred. const. ind. Heterog. cred. const. ind.
Quartile In pp of init. ind. level Share in rm-type growth In pp of init. ind. level Share in rm-type growth
Domestic rms
1 1.01 34.59 0.47 18.08
2 0.73 25.00 0.34 13.08
3 0.69 23.63 0.45 17.31
4 0.49 16.78 1.34 51.54
Total 2.92 100 2.60 100
Exporting rms
1 0.75 15.43 0.89 18.43
2 1.04 21.40 1.04 21.53
3 1.51 31.07 2.25 46.58
4 1.56 32.10 0.65 13.46
Total 4.86 100 4.83 100
All rms
1 1.78 22.88 1.27 17.09
2 1.69 21.72 1.18 15.88
3 1.81 23.26 2.66 36.80
4 2.51 32.26 2.32 31.22
Total 7.78 100 7.43 100
Table 17: Credit constraints and industry-level sales growth 1996-2002
Homog. cred. const. ind. Heterog. cred. const. ind.
Quartile In pp of init. ind. level Share in rm-type growth In pp of init. ind. level Share in rm-type growth
Domestic rms
1 0.96 11.91 0.35 7.99
2 1.18 14.64 0.48 10.96
3 1.98 24.57 0.85 19.41
4 3.93 48.76 2.71 61.87
Total 8.06 100 4.38 100
Exporting rms
1 1.21 3.92 1.15 2.58
2 2.36 7.64 1.79 4.02
3 4.62 14.96 4.82 10.82
4 22.69 73.88 36.77 82.57
Total 30.88 100 44.53 100
All rms
1 1.86 4.78 1.31 2.68
2 3.03 7.78 2.24 4.58
3 5.82 14.95 4.80 9.81
4 28.23 72.50 40.57 82.95
Total 38.94 100 48.91 100
36dierence across countries, industries or periods in one of these three dimensions can modify
the sign and the intensity of the rm size-investment and the rm size-growth relationship at
equilibrium. As an example, I show that in France, heterogeneous credit constraints, which
aect the shape of the marginal cost of investment, can explain cross-sectoral variations in
the rm size-investment and rm size-growth relationship over the 1996-2002 period. A more
structural approach could then be useful to get insights on the quantitative aspects of the
mechanisms I highlight, to estimate for example how much heterogeneous credit constraints
should be to induce a reversal in the size-growth relationship. Such an approach could for
example help determine whether and to which extent conicting results obtained by Lileeva
and Treer (2010) and Bustos (2011) are explained by the shape of prot, the shape of credit
constraints or the technology of investment.
From a macroeconomic perspective, the framework I propose is useful to understand the
distribution of activities and of opportunities across rms. It is then crucial to assess whether
there exists an unexploited growth potential among SME's, and to design adequate policies
aiming at reducing potential barriers to the development of small rms. Indeed, even though
small rms are disproportionately credit constrained, it will not be necessarily eciency-
improving to facilitate their access to credit if potential growth of smaller rms is lower than
growth of big rms.
This paper also relates to recent analysis on the role of \granularity" in explaining macroe-
conomic uctuations. Gabaix (2011) shows that when the size distribution of rms is fat-
tailed, the law of large number breaks down so that the idiosyncratic shocks aecting big
rms might explain a large share of output variations. I propose here a potential determinant
of the granularity of economic activities, so that my results suggest that heterogeneous credit
constraints might impact on aggregate output volatility through the granularity channel.
Finally, beyond the example of the rm size-growth relationship, the theoretical and
empirical framework I develop in this paper can be applied in many elds to understand
heterogeneous responses of economic agents: rm-level outsourcing or location decisions in
international trade and urban economics, participation to various programs in labour and
development economics are a few examples of possible applications.
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43B Identication of heterogeneous credit constraints




















































is the cash-ow to capital
ratio, controlling for internal liquidities of the rm and L stands for rm-level employment.
The estimation of this equation is subject to several drawbacks. First, rm-level unobserved
characteristics, invariant across time, might impact on both investment behaviour and ex-
planatory variables (risk-aversion of the entrepreneur, network of the entrepreneurs in terms
of potential investors etc.). These determinants can be taken into account by rst dierenc-
ing the variables or by including rm-level xed eects. However, some industry-level and/or
rm-level shocks might also bias the results, while the dynamic nature of the model makes the
rms xed eects and rst-dierenced estimations potentially spurious. This is why GMM
estimations are sometimes adopted. However, as emphasized by Hall, Mairesse, and Mulkay
(1999), GMM often behave poorly due to relatively weak instruments.
I actually propose four specications: without xed eects, with industry-year xed ef-
fects, with rm-level xed eects and with both industry-year and rm xed eects. If results
on the coecient of interest  all go in the same direction, this will be an index of the reli-
ability of my ndings. I tried to implement GMM estimations but instruments perform very
poorly.
I also estimate two other models: a slightly modied Euler equation sometimes used in the
literature (based on dierent assumptions on the adjustment cost function, see Love, 2003;
Harrison, Love, and McMillan, 2004) and an accelerator specication (Hall, Mairesse, and
Mulkay, 1999; Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2009).
I rst estimate the equation separately for each 2-digit manufacturing industries (results
available upon request). Several reasons can explain why in a given country like France, the
shape of credit constraints dier across industries: the asymmetries in terms of information
about the nancial health of rms may not be the same across sectors, the degree of com-
petition within the industry might impact on the access of small rms to external nance,
sectors might be heterogeneous in terms of collateralizable assets etc. For a given industry, I
consider that credit constraints are tougher for smaller rms if  is negative and signicant
in the rm-xed eect specication for at least two of the three estimated models.
I then pool together the observations of each type of industries and run the estimations
44on these pooled observations. Results are presented in Table 19. They show that my classi-
cation of industries is robust to the estimation strategy: in the rst sample of industries, the
coecient  is never signicant and close to 0. On the contrary, the coecient  is always
negative and signicant for the pooled sample of rms belonging to industries that had been
identied as industries with heterogeneous credit constraints in the rst step. Results are
the same for the modied Euler model and for the accelerator model (see Tables 20 and 21).
Note that results are qualitatively the same with a dierent time-structure, including rm-
level employment at time t   1 instead of t.11
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































48C Shape of credit constraints and rm-level relative size dis-
tribution
Table 22: Firm-level relative size distribution: Value added
Homog. cred. const. ind. Heterog. cred. const. ind.
Percent. Domestic Exporters Domestic Exporters
10 0.34 0.15 0.25 0.09
25 0.43 0.22 0.33 0.13
50 0.59 0.37 0.47 0.25
75 0.91 0.74 0.74 0.63
90 1.46 1.67 1.46 1.65
95 2.08 3.01 2.49 3.20
Note: The table reads as follows: in 1996, the 10th percentile of the
ratio of rm-level value added to industry-level rm average
value added is equal, on average, to 34% for domestic rms
in industries where credit constraints are homogenous, and to
25% for domestic rms in industries where small rms are dis-
proportionately credit-constrained. Exporting rms are rms
declaring exports bigger than 50 000 euros.
49D Firm-level Tfp and Value added growth
Table 23: Firm-level Tfp growth - Initially domestic rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln LP Tfpi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.404a -0.509a - 0.392a -0.506a
(0.044) (0.059) (0.043) (0.058)
Switching exporters 0.041c 0.036c 0.021 0.011
(0.020) (0.020) (0.025) (0.026)
Alternate exporters 0.040b 0.030b -0.013 -0.026
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.023)
Ln Li1996 0.001 0.017 0.046b 0.060a
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 0.237a 0.266a
(0.058) (0.093)
Occasional exporters -0.009 -0.038
(0.024) (0.026)
Observations 3678 3678 1998 1998
R2 0.145 0.160 0.136 0.154
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
50Table 24: Firm-level Tfp growth - Initially exporting rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln LP Tfpi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.330a -0.401a -0.391a -0.453a
(0.031) (0.046) (0.036) (0.041)
Ceasing exporters -0.090b -0.088b -0.056b -0.052b
(0.037) (0.034) (0.025) (0.026)
Ln Li1996 -0.010 -0.002 0.056a 0.058a
(0.015) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 0.198b 0.201a
(0.084) (0.060)
Occasional domestic rms -0.040c -0.022
(0.022) (0.035)
Observations 3479 3479 3548 3548
R2 0.097 0.107 0.120 0.128
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
Table 25: Firm-level Value added growth - Initially domestic rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln Value addedi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Value addedi1996 -0.184a -0.159a -0.104a -0.082b
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.031)
Switching exporters 0.156a 0.157a 0.145a 0.125a
(0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.040)
Alternate exporters 0.052a 0.051b 0.000 -0.018
(0.019) (0.021) (0.027) (0.029)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.106 -0.053
(0.069) (0.113)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 0.054 -0.071
(0.060) (0.140)
Exported once 0.006 -0.114a
(0.034) (0.034)
Observations 3678 3678 1998 1998
R2 0.076 0.078 0.036 0.042
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
51Table 26: Firm-level Value added growth - Initially exporting rms
Dependent Variable:  Ln Value addedi
Homogenous credit constraints Heterogeneous credit constraints
Ln Value addedi1996 -0.102a -0.086a -0.071a -0.024c
(0.016) (0.021) (0.007) (0.013)
Ceasing exporters -0.196a -0.201a -0.159a -0.166a
(0.043) (0.038) (0.044) (0.042)
Ln LP Tfpi1996 -0.122 -0.181a
(0.074) (0.058)
Ln Avg Wagei1996 0.167c -0.088
(0.098) (0.064)
Occasional domestic rms -0.060c -0.075c
(0.031) (0.039)
Observations 3479 3479 3548 3548
R2 0.040 0.046 0.027 0.043
Note: Industry 3-digit xed eects are included in all the regressions. Standard errors in parentheses a,
b and c respectively denoting signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Robust standard errors.
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